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2Introduction 
The Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava tradition is a Hindu devotional tradition that originated in the Bengal region of 
India during the 16th century. It holds Kṛṣṇa to be the supreme and personal deity and exclusive object 
of devotion. Early Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theologians developed and advocated a path of devotion (bhakti-
mārga) over other paths as the best means for realizing one’s true eternal nature (svarūpa), attaining 
the highest level of transcendental pleasure (ānanda), and achieving liberation from the cycle of birth 
and death (sāṃsāra). The starting point of the path of devotion is śraddhā, or ‘faith;’ the overarching 
goal of following the path is to attain premā, or ‘divine love’ for Kṛṣṇa; and the principal means of 
attaining premā consists of faithfully engaging in sādhana, a range of diverse regulated religious 
practices that systematically engage the mind and body in devotional acts. In the course and 
consequence of attaining the goal of premā, early Gauḍīya theologians reference and describe 
occurrences of devotees having what they refer to as a ‘direct perceptual experience’ (sākṣātkāra) of 
Kṛṣṇa relative to the devotee’s qualifications and devotional temperament.1 These ‘direct perceptual 
experiences’ (sākṣātkāra) are construed as Kṛṣṇa personally manifesting himself to the devotee in a 
manner that allows the devotee to directly (sākṣāt)—in an immediate sense—perceive Kṛṣṇa’s non-
material anthropomorphic form and presence. In other words, they are not experiences of perceiving 
Kṛṣṇa as if he were manifest in front them, but they are experiences of perceiving Kṛṣṇa, who is 
manifest in front of them. So for example in his normative descriptions of such an experience, 
Viśvanātha Cākravartin, one of the most important second generation Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theologians, 
writes that when a devotee attains supreme love (premā) for Kṛṣṇa, it attracts Kṛṣṇa like a magnet and 
causes him to become visible to the devotee’s eyes (nayana-gocarī) and perceptible to the other senses 
relative to how the devotee thinks about and emotionally relates to Kṛṣṇa.2   
1 See for example Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu 1.1.39, 1.2.182, 2.5.11, 2.5.81, and 3.1.36-42; Bhakti Sandarbha 1, 7, 15, 16, 161, 
179, 187, 188, 189, 234, 256, 268, 277, and 279; and Mādhurya Kādambinī 6 and 8. 
2 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.4-5 (Numbering follows the edition published by Sri Krishna Chaitanya Shastra Mandir, 2005). 
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Traditional historical scholarship has drawn our attention to the importance early Gauḍīya 
theologians placed on the occurrence of these direct perceptual experiences of Kṛṣṇa in the course and 
consequence of successfully traversing the path of bhakti and attaining premā.  David Haberman 
(1988), for example, notes that the goal of smaraṇa meditation—an important Gauḍīya practice that 
involves visualizing Kṛṣṇa’s qualities, companions, service, and līlās (‘divine play’)—is ‘for the 
Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas to achieve a direct vision (sākṣāt-darśana) of Kṛṣṇa and his dramatic world’ 
(Haberman, 1988, p.126). And Barbara Holdrege (2007) provides an analysis of some of the key 
practices that lead to direct perceptual experiences (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa’s form and līlā, or ‘divine 
play.’ Traditional historical scholarship has also clearly demonstrated that these theologians frame their 
references and descriptions of these and other types of acknowledged experiences in terminology and 
categories that are drawn from a long tradition of Sanskrit poetics and aesthetic theory that preceded 
the development of Gauḍīya theology.3 What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which these 
references and descriptions may also reflect actual experiences that they or others had. 
Using Viśvanātha Cākravartin’s descriptions of a direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of 
Kṛṣṇa that are found in his Mādhurya Kādambinī (circa. 17th c.) as a case study, the purpose of this 
paper is to investigate whether or not we can plausibly account for the occurrence of private perceptual 
experiences that may form a phenomenological basis for what he describes and appraises as a direct 
perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa within the framework of methodological naturalism.4 
Investigating whether or not the occurrence of such experiences can plausibly be understood within a 
naturalistic framework serves to bridge the methodological divide that often separates the humanities 
and sciences and facilitate a richer interpretation and explanation of historical claims than what is 
usually available through traditional humanistic approaches alone. If we can offer a plausible account 
                                                 
3 For a summary of the lineage of the aesthetic traditions that inform early Gauḍīya theology, see Haberman (2003), Chapter 
Two. 
4 Methodological naturalism seeks to explain phenomena in terms of natural principles and processes as far as possible 
without appeal to any kind of supernatural influence, but without commitment to the metaphysical assumptions of 
ontological naturalism. 
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in naturalistic terms, it offers support for the hypothesis that Viśvanātha’s descriptions are likely 
reflective, at least to some extent, of experiences that he (or others) had. If we cannot, it suggest that his 
claims may be better understood as solely or primarily the result of the teachings he inherited and his 
exegetical ruminations thereof.   
An additional aim of this paper is to illustrate some of the ways in which historians can make 
use of existing scientific and quasi-scientific research for developing and supporting informed working 
hypotheses about cultural-related phenomena in historical contexts. These informed working 
hypotheses can then be used as a basis for developing well-formed and well-informed hypotheses that 
are potentially testable. Developing well-formed and well-informed hypotheses can serve two critical 
roles for humanistic studies of religious culture and phenomena. First, they can serve as bases for 
developing carefully constructed experimental and quasi-experimental research designs in 
collaboration with scientists and psychologists. These can be implemented for generating quantifiable 
data that will either lend support to or weaken the original working hypotheses. Second, they can serve 
as warranted justification for the great deal of effort and resources, such as time and money, which are 
needed to conduct such studies. 
Method 
In order to investigate whether or not the occurrence of what Viśvanātha describes and appraises as a 
direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa within the framework of methodological naturalism, 
we can look to other types of experiences that can serve as heuristic analogues about which the natural 
processes involved in their generation and formation are better understood. Experiences that share 
uniquely similar structural and phenomenological features with direct perceptual experience 
(sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa that distinguish both from other kinds of perceptual experiences are the most 
useful for our purposes. This is because within the framework of naturalism, the combination of natural 
processes that are responsible for uniquely shared structural and phenomenological features are likely 
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to be similar in many ways due to the shared biological and cognitive architectures that are responsible 
for modulating human perceptual experiences across cultures.  
In order to find such an analogue, it is helpful to distinguish between the occurrence of a 
perceptual experience and the second-order act of appraising it as this or that, since 
phenomenologically similar kinds of perceptual experiences may be interpreted and appraised 
differently relative to culturally determined criteria, metaphysical presuppositions, and methods of 
interpretation and evaluation. For example, a person who is committed to a Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava 
understanding of the world will interpret and evaluate a person’s claim of having a private perceptual 
experience of Kṛṣṇa differently than a person who is committed to a naturalistic understanding of the 
world. By making this distinction between the occurrence of a perceptual experience and the second-
order act of appraising it as this or that, we can more clearly discern and take advantage of existing 
research on experiences that cultures may appraise differently, but which are nonetheless constituted of 
uniquely similar structural and phenomenological features. In order to keep this distinction saliently in 
mind, throughout this paper I refer to the experiences under investigation in an ascriptive manner 
despite the awkwardness of using the long form reference.5 So for example, I will refer to the direct 
perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa that Viśvanātha describes as a ‘perceptual experience that 
Viśvanātha describes and appraises as a direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa’.  
One set of perceptual experiences that shares a remarkably unique set of structural and 
phenomenological features with the perceptual experience that Viśvanātha describes and appraises as a 
direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa is the set of experiences that are appraised as 
‘hallucinations’ in mainstream western psychological contexts. An experience that is appraised as a 
hallucination in these contexts can be defined as a ‘sensory experience which occurs in the absence of 
corresponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ, has a sufficient sense of reality to 
                                                 
5 See Taves (2009), Religious Experience Reconsidered, pp. 8-26 for a more complete discussion of the scholarly benefits 
that can be derived from adopting an ascriptive approach for comparative and analytical purposes. 
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resemble a veridical perception, over which the subject does not feel s/he has direct and voluntary 
control, and which occurs in the awake state’ (David, 2004, pp. 107-124). These defining 
characteristics share key parallels with the perceptual experience that Viśvanātha describes and 
appraises in the Mādhurya Kādambinī as a direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa. In both 
cases, they can be described as perceptual experiences that 1) have no corresponding external stimuli 
that are publicly accessible, 2) are perceived as real to the person having the experience, 3) are not 
under the subject’s direct and voluntary control; and 4) occur, at least initially, in an awake state. This 
set of features distinguishes these perceptual experiences from other types of perceptual experiences, 
such as the perceptual experience of perceiving a tree, for example, which has the tree as the 
perception’s corresponding, publicly accessible external stimulus. Within the framework of naturalism, 
the set of uniquely shared features that Viśvanātha describes and appraises as a direct perceptual 
experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa and the set of experiences that are appraised as ‘hallucinations’ in 
mainstream western psychological contexts suggests that similar natural processes would be involved 
in the occurrences of both. While these features distinguish these perceptual experiences from other 
types of perceptual experiences, it is important to recognize some of the critical differences that 
distinguish the way in which these analogues are interpreted and appraised.  
Within the framework of Gauḍīya theology, perceptual experiences that are appraised as direct 
perceptual experiences (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa are viewed as having a corresponding external stimulus, 
namely Kṛṣṇa, who is believed to be a real and living deity who possesses a non-material 
anthropomorphic form. This deity is not, however, perceivable to the general public but only to those 
to whom he chooses to reveal himself. Within the framework of naturalism, however, phenomena are 
interpreted and evaluated in terms of naturalistic principles without appeal to any supernatural 
principles or causation. Within this framework there is no method to evaluate the claim that there is a 
supernatural deity referred to as Kṛṣṇa who can make himself perceivable at will to anyone he chooses 
at any time while remaining unperceivable to those to whom he chooses not to reveal himself. Such 
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supernatural claims fall outside the purview of naturalistic study and explanation. As a result, this study 
does not—and indeed cannot—speak to or make any claims about whether or not there is a real deity 
that is responsible for the occurrence of perceptual experiences that Viśvanātha or other early Gauḍīya 
theologians reference, and/or describe, and appraise as direct perceptual experiences (sākṣātkāra) of 
Kṛṣṇa.6 
Another critical difference is that within the framework of Gauḍīya theology, perceptual 
experiences that early Gauḍīya theologians reference, and/or describe, and appraise as direct perceptual 
experiences (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa are viewed positively and symptomatic of one who has received 
Kṛṣṇa’s divine grace and attained the highest and most celebrated goal of life. In contrast, within 
western psychological models, perceptual experiences that are appraised as hallucinations are typically 
viewed negatively as a form of perceptual error and often times associated with various mental 
disorders. This latter association, though, may be due more to fact that, until recently, most of the 
research studies on these kinds of perceptual experiences have developed in the context of studies on 
the clinical populations in which they commonly occur, rather than on non-clinical populations. 
Increasingly, both psychological and anthropological researches on private perceptual experiences that 
psychologists and others operating within the framework of methodological naturalism appraise as 
hallucinations have shown that these experiences are not limited to people with clinical conditions.  
For example, a study performed by Maurice Ohayon (2002) indicated that nearly 40% of the 
general population in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy has had an experience that qualifies as a 
hallucination. In addition to the use of psychoactive substances and alcohol, significant variables 
associated with the onset of various kinds of hallucinations—visual, auditory, olfactory, haptic, 
hypnagogic and hypnopompic—included anxiety, depression, sensory deprivation, and lack of or too 
much sleep (Ohayon, 2000, pp. 162-163).  
                                                 
6 Understanding how to reconcile the role that mental processes may play in the generation and formation of these 
experiences with theological understandings of Kṛṣṇa as an ontologically real deity with agency is an area of study for 
constructive theologians, rather than the secular scholar. 
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And in a recent article, Tanja Luhrmann (2011) argues that existing anthropological research 
suggests there are three distinct patterns of hallucinatory experiences that can be discerned: 1) those 
that are rare, brief, and non-distressing; 2) those that are frequent, extended, and distressing; and 3) 
those that are frequent but non-distressing (Luhrmann, 2011, pp. 73-76). Of these three, the second is 
typically associated with psychosis in psychiatric contexts and cause psychological distress. The other 
two, however, do not cause psychological distress and are frequently found to occur in various cultural 
and religious contexts among populations that would not be diagnosed as having a mental disorder. In 
this regard, the fifth and most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (2013) emphasizes the importance of clinicians taking into account a client’s religious and 
cultural background when making a diagnosis of an individual’s condition, being careful to distinguish 
culturally sanctioned response patterns from those that would otherwise be viewed as an indicator of 
psychotic disorders.   
For the purposes of this investigation, I focus on Viśvanātha’s references and descriptions of a 
perceptual experience that he appraises as a direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa in his 
Mādhurya Kādambinī rather than those of other early Gauḍīya theologians for several reasons. First, he 
offers one of the most extensive and rich phenomenological descriptions and discussions that can be 
found in the primary literature. These descriptions form part of his exegetical elaborations on the nine 
progressive stages of self-transformation and development that culminate in the attainment of premā, 
or ‘supreme love,’ which were first articulated by Rūpa Gosvāmin,7 who is arguably the Gauḍīya 
tradition’s most influential and innovative theologians.  
Second, while there is much that is conventional in Viśvanātha’s account, the tenor and content 
of key descriptions and discussions he offers suggests that he is likely basing them, at least to some 
extent, on personal experiences he (or possibly others) had, rather than being solely based on inherited 
teachings and interpretations thereof. For example, near the end of his description of the devotee’s 
                                                 
7 Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu 1.4.15-16. 
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direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa, he compares the devotee’s emotional response to 
that of a poet who realizes that his attempts to allude to the Lord’s splendorous form through poetic 
analogy amount to a transgression and defilement in light of the form he has just seen (samīkṣita-śrī-
mūrti-rūpeṇa).8 Furthermore, though he writes from a third person point of view in the capacity of an 
exegetical commentator, he does not include any scriptural proof texts in the context of his descriptions 
of the direct perceptual experience of Kṛṣṇa, which is a standard and expected practice in Gauḍīya 
exegetical work. He justifies this exclusion by stating that what he has described is brought directly 
(sākṣāt) into the range of sensory experience (sākṣād-anubhava-gocaratām prāpiteṣu) and that 
referencing such evidence obstructs the path of such direct experience (pramāṇāpekṣayā hy anubhava-
vartma-pāruṣyā-pādakatvāt).9 This claim seems to imply that he is basing his descriptions, at least in 
part, on experiences he personally had rather than basing them solely on inherited teachings and 
interpretations thereof.  
Direct Perceptual Experiences (Sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa 
The first six stages of devotion that Viśvanātha discusses in his Mādhurya Kādambinī include the 
development of faith (śraddhā), the importance of being in the company of and taking guidance from 
advanced saintly persons (sādhu-saṅga), ‘unsteady engagement in devotional practices’ (aniṣṭhitā 
bhajana-kriyā), ‘clearing of obstacles’ (anartha-nivṛttiḥ) that prevent one from steady engagement in 
devotional practices, ‘steady engagement in devotional practices’ (niṣṭhitā bhajana-kriyā), and 
eventually a particular ‘relish’ (ruci) for practicing them. These practices would have included 
observing various sexual regulations and dietary laws and engaging in various ritual, meditative, and 
visualization practices. The final three stages, wherein Viśvanātha describes the onset of a perceptual 
experience that he describes and appraises as a direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa, 
consists of the development of ‘attachment’ (āsakti) to Kṛṣṇa, which is viewed as a maturation of the 
                                                 
8 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.10. 
9 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.12.  
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previous stage of ‘relish’ (ruci); the development of ‘loving emotion’ (bhāva) for Kṛṣṇa, which is 
viewed as a maturation of ‘attachment’ (āsakti) and causes the devotee to think and relate to Kṛṣṇa in 
particular ways relative to the particular type of love one feels towards Kṛṣṇa;10 and then finally, under 
the right conditions, the development of ‘supreme love’ (premā), which Viśvanātha praises as the 
‘crown-jewel of human pursuits’ (puruṣārtha cūḍāmaṇiḥ). Viśvanātha’s descriptions of these final 
three stages, which I will now discuss more fully, serve as the primary focus of this study. 
Āsakti, ‘Attachment’ 
The seventh stage in the development of ‘supreme love,’ or premā, is the development of āsakti, or 
‘attachment.’ The signature characteristic of one who has advanced to this level is the development of 
deep emotional attachment to Kṛṣṇa, who Viśvanātha describes as becoming the primary object 
(viṣaya) of the practitioner’s attention and devotion over and above anything else.11 At this stage 
Viśvanātha describes the devotee’s mind as no longer drifting from absorption in thoughts of Kṛṣṇa to 
other topics, as he described was the case in the preceding stage of development (ruci), but rather as 
automatically drifting from other topics to thoughts of Kṛṣṇa.12 He describes this level of attachment to 
Kṛṣṇa as ‘polishing the mirror of the heart in such a way that the Lord, who is suddenly reflected there 
[in the heart], becomes almost as if visible’ (āsaktir evāntaḥ-karaṇa-mukuraṃ tathā mārjayati yathā 
tatra sahasā pratibimbito bhagavān avalokyamāna iva bhavati)13 and causing objects, people, events 
or circumstances that the devotee comes across to effortlessly remind the devotee of Kṛṣṇa and increase 
his desire to attain him. In his description, he compares the devotee’s state of mind to that of a covetous 
merchant:  
                                                 
10 There are five principle forms of love that one can cultivate in relation to Kṛṣṇa: 1) a neutral form of love (śānta), 2) love 
in service (dāsa), 3) love as a friend (sakhi), 4) love as a protector or parent (pitṛ), and 5) love as a lover (preyasī); see 
Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.4. 
11 Mādhurya Kādambinī 6.1. 
12 Mādhurya Kādambinī 6.1. 
13 Mādhurya Kādambinī 6.1. 
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Dwelling in his own home like a miserly merchant who is greedily desirous of great wealth, he 
sits down, then gets up, then sleeps, and anxiously thinks (^cint) with a forlorn expression: 
‘What should I do? Where should I go? By what means could I obtain that desired object?14  
 
He further describes the devotee as sometimes exhibiting odd behavior, which causes people to think 
he has gone out of his mind (channa-buddhiḥ), among other misinterpretations.   
Bhāva/rati: the eighth stage 
As āsakti matures, it is transformed into bhāva, which is also referred to as rati, or ‘love’ for 
Kṛṣṇa.15 Viśvanātha describes the devotee at this level of development as intensely longing to 
relish the various attributes of Kṛṣṇa’s divine form to such an extent that he feels he will be able 
to experience (anu +^bhū) and perceive (^lābh) them at any moment. He longs to see the 
blackness of Kṛṣṇa’s limbs, the reddish tinges of the corners of his eyes and lips, the white hue 
of moonlight that is his smile; and the yellow color of his clothes and ornaments; he longs to 
hear the song of Kṛṣṇa’s flute and the jingling of his ankle bells; he wonders what it would be 
like to feel the tender touch of Kṛṣṇa’s two hands, which causes his hairs to stand erect; his 
nose opens wide as if he can perceive (^labh) Kṛṣṇa’s sweet fragrance; and it seems as though 
he can taste the moisture of Kṛṣṇa’s lips.16  
 In this state, Viśvanātha describes the devotee as having a flashing glimpse of Kṛṣṇa 
(tadīya-sphūrti) that causes his mind to rejoice as if Kṛṣṇa were immediately present (sākṣāt) 
before him.17 When this flashing glimpse and the sweetness of relishing him disappears, he 
describes the devotee as becoming depressed (vi + ^sad) and exhausted (^glai).18 He further 
describes the devotee as remembering Kṛṣṇa at all times; becoming increasingly identified 
                                                 
14 Mādhurya Kādambinī 6.2. All translations of Sanskrit texts are the result of a joint effort between me and Aleksandar 
Uskokov. 
15 Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.1. 
16 Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.2. 
17 Within Gauḍīya theology, the sphūrti form of Krṣṇa is a “flashing vision” or “flashing appearance” of Kṛṣṇa, often 
occurring during deep states of meditative absorption or separation. It is typically fleeting and serves as a foreshadowing or 
foretaste of the encounter to come, such as the more sustained and defined perceptual experiences of Kṛṣṇa that Viśvanātha 
discusses occur during the stage of premā. For more discussion on the nuance of the term and its distinctions from other 
manifestations of Kṛṣṇa, see Brzezinski (1997), p. 58 and Brzezinski (1999), pp. 21-22.  
18 Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.2.  
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(ahantā) with a siddha-deha, or ‘perfected body,’ which is used in meditative practices to serve 
and relate to Kṛṣṇa in a particular loving way; and experiencing a strong sense of possessive 
attachment (mamatā) for Kṛṣṇa that Viśvanātha compares to that which a bee might have for 
the honey of Kṛṣṇa’s lotus-like feet.19  
 As in the previous stage of āsakti, his behavior can be such that common people think 
he has gone mad (unmatta), though advanced practitioners recognize his advanced state.20 
Viśvanātha also discusses the different types of loving moods with which a devotee may 
identify that causes the devotee to experience the Lord’s sweetness in particular ways relative to 
his or her particular feelings of love of which there are five principle kinds: a neutral form of 
love (śānta), love in service (dāsa), love as a friend (sakhi), love as a protector or parent (pitṛ), 
and love as a lover (preyasī).21  
Premā: the ninth stage 
Viśvanātha then describes that bhāva, under the right conditions, matures into premā, an emotional 
state appraised as pure love for Kṛṣṇa, which is the culminating ninth and final stage towards which the 
others lead. When premā arises, Viśvanātha describes the devotee’s remaining emotional attachments 
to the products of the mundane world as being redirected to the sweetness of Kṛṣṇa’s transcendent 
qualities, name, and form.22 Following Rūpa’s descriptions before him, Viśvanātha characterizes premā 
as consisting of a special form of condensed bliss (sāndrānanda-viśeṣātmā) that attracts Kṛṣṇa.23 He 
compares the mental state of a devotee who is under the influence of premā to the mental states of a 
great warrior and a greedy thief, both of whom have lost all sense of discrimination and all sense of 
themselves due to their frenzied absorption in the objects they seek.  
                                                 
19 Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.3. 
20 Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.3. 
21 Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.4. 
22 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.1. 
23 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.2. 
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He further compares the devotee’s longing for Kṛṣṇa to the scorching heat of the sun and a 
hunger that cannot be satiated until the sweetness of Kṛṣṇa’s qualities and forms appear (āvirbhāvita) 
due to having a sudden flashing glimpse (sphūrti) of him.24 As premā increases, the devotee’s intense 
longing to have a direct perceptual experience of perceiving Kṛṣṇa directly (bhagavat-sākṣātkāram) 
increases. In other words, he longs for Kṛṣṇa to personally manifest himself in a manner that allows the 
devotee to directly (sākṣāt)—in an immediate sense—perceive Kṛṣṇa’s form and presence. Flashing 
glimpses (sphūrti) of Kṛṣṇa at this point no longer pacify the devotee’s intense yearning and, as he 
loses all attraction for mundane objects, Viśvanātha describes him as falling into a state of repentant 
anguish.25  
 Viśvanātha then describes how the devotee’s pure love (premā) attracts Kṛṣṇa and causes Kṛṣṇa 
to become visible to the eyes (nayana-gocarīkaroti) of the devotee, who becomes overwhelmed with 
an ocean of bliss that ‘cannot be measured with the stick of a poet’s eloquence’ (nārhati kavi-sarasvatī-
lakuṭyā parimeyatām).26 He describes Kṛṣṇa as first manifesting (prakāśyate) his beauty to the 
astonished devotee’s eyes (locanayoḥ), the sweetness of which causes all the devotee’s senses and 
mind to become like eyes, which brings about obstacles such as paralysis, shivering and tears. The 
resulting bliss he experiences causes him to swoon with ecstasy. Then as if to awaken him, Kṛṣṇa 
manifests his fragrance to the devotee’s nose and senses, all of which become like the nose and the 
devotee swoons a second time.27 Viśvanātha then goes on to describe similar patterns occuring with 
regard to Kṛṣṇa’s manifesting himself to the devotees other senses, including the ears, sense of touch, 
and sense of taste and the devotee’s experience of Kṛṣṇa’s magnanimity, compassion and affection.28  
 He describes the devotee as perceiving these manifestations of Kṛṣṇa in different ways relative 
to the particular loving mood (bhāva) with which the devotee identifies. For example, the devotee who 
                                                 
24 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.2.  
25 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.3. 
26 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.4.  
27 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.5. 
28 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.5-8. 
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relates to and loves Kṛṣṇa in the mood of service feels his touch as the Lord’s feet on his head; one who 
relates to and loves Kṛṣṇa in the mood of friendship feels the touch of Kṛṣṇa’s hands on his own hands; 
those who have parental affection for him feel the touch of wiping Kṛṣṇa’s tears from his face; and 
those who relate to him as their lover feel his touch as the touch of his chest on theirs.29 Included in this 
account is a conversational exchange he narrates as taking place between Kṛṣṇa and the devotee. 
Therein the devotee declares his previous poetic attempts to describe the beauty of Kṛṣṇa’s form 
through various poetic analogies as falling woefully short in light of the form of Kṛṣṇa he has just seen 
(samīkṣita-śrī-mūrti-rūpeṇa) and the visions of Kṛṣṇa’s intimate associates and intimate places within 
Kṛṣṇa’s divine realm of Vṛndāvana that were shown (darśayitvā) to him.  
 After these visions disappear,30 Viśvanātha describes the devotee as gaining external awareness, 
opening his eyes, and desiring to see (didṛkṣur) Kṛṣṇa again. When he does not see him, he becomes 
distressed and questions whether what he has just experienced was a dream, an illusion, the result of 
some mental confusion, a mental concoction created by his strong desire to see Kṛṣṇa, a direct 
perceptual experience of him due to having a flashing glimpse (sphūrti) of him, and so on.31 No longer 
seeing Kṛṣṇa, Viśvanātha describes the devotee as exhibiting erratic behavior and disturbed states of 
mind.32 When he relates his doubts and experiences to a friend, the friend tells him that he is very 
fortunate because he has had a direct perceptual experience of the Lord (bhagavat-sākṣātkāra).33 
Hearing this, the devotee then wonders what he has done to achieve such a good fortune and if he will 
have the experience again, though these sentiments and ruminations quickly devolve into deep dismay 
and depression, motivating the devotee to go into isolation where he longingly prays to see (^dṛś) 
Kṛṣṇa’s form again. No longer seeing him, however, he suffers and longingly weeps for Kṛṣṇa until he 
                                                 
29 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.5. 
30 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.10. 
31 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.11. 
32 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.11. 
33 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.11.  
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passes from his body, which Viśvanātha describes as Kṛṣṇa making himself directly perceivable 
(pratyakśībhūya) to the devotee and leading him to his divine abode.34  
 Viśvanātha concludes his descriptions by declaring the meaning of Rūpa Gosvāmin’s passage 
regarding these nine stages of personal transformation and development as now being properly 
revealed. He notes that he is aware of even higher states of attainable forms of love that Rūpa 
Gosvāmin discusses, but he declines to describe them because they would be too intense to experience 
in the physical body.  It is at this point that he notes he has not included scriptural evidence for his 
descriptions of the higher stages of devotion, which he claims are brought directly into the range of 
sensory experience (sākṣād-anubhava-gocaratām prāpiteṣu). The reason for their exclusion, he argues, 
is because referencing such texts would serve to obstruct the experience of directly perceiving him 
(pramāṇāpekṣayā hy anubhava-vartma-pāruṣyā-pādakatvāt).35 However, for the sake of those who 
depend on them, he then goes on to offer a succinct list of scriptural references that are intended to 
support key aspects of what he has just described.    
Analysis 
In the above descriptions, Viśvanātha offers an extensive description of Kṛṣṇa manifesting 
himself to the devotee in a manner that allows the devotee to directly (sākṣāt) perceive Kṛṣṇa 
and the various aspects of his form and nature, which causes the devotee to become emotionally 
overwhelmed until Kṛṣṇa withdraws. Traditional historical-critical scholarship makes it clear 
that Viśvanātha articulates and frames his descriptions in terminology and categories that 
historically preceded him. For this reason, it is difficult to determine with any certainty the 
extent to which the details of Viśvanātha’s descriptions build on the phenomenological content 
of what he or others may have actually experienced and to what extent they are, intentionally or 
not, the product of historical influence and theological conformity. However, as noted earlier, 
                                                 
34 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.11. 
35 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.12.  
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he argues that he has not included scriptural evidence in the course of his descriptions because 
what he has described is brought directly (sākṣāt) into the range of sensory experience (sākṣād-
anubhava-gocaratām prāpiteṣu) and referencing such evidence would cause an obstruction of 
that direct experience (pramāṇāpekṣayā hy anubhava-vartma-pāruṣyā-pādakatvāt).36 This 
suggests that his descriptions build on experiences he (or possibly others) personally had.  
In order to further evaluate this possibility, the analysis that follows focuses on using 
contemporary psychological research to determine whether or not we can plausibly account in 
natural terms for the occurrence of private perceptual experiences that may form a 
phenomenological basis for Viśvanātha’s descriptions. This analysis, as discussed earlier, uses 
private perceptual experiences that are appraised as hallucinations as a heuristic analogue in 
light of 1) the unique structural and phenomenal features they share with private perceptual 
experiences that Viśvanātha describes and appraises as direct perceptual experiences of Kṛṣṇa, 
and 2) the extensive research that has been done on the mental processes involved in their 
generation and formation and the conditions under which these occur. With this in mind, I first 
analyze and present evidence from contemporary psychological research that implicates key 
mental processes in the occurrence of private perceptual experiences that are appraised as 
hallucinations and the conditions under which these mental processes are mobilized; second, I 
examine parallels that Viśvanātha explicitly or implicitly includes in his descriptions; and third 
I develop examples of potentially testable hypotheses in light of these parallels that can serve as 
a basis for further research. I follow this analysis section with a general discussion on the 
methodological limitations of this study, suggestions for future research, and a conclusion. 
Emotions 
Psychological research has implicated stressful and anxious emotional states in the precipitation 
of private perceptual experiences that are appraised as hallucinations. Viśvanātha also describes 
                                                 
36 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.12. 37 Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.2. 
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the devotee as experiencing stressful and anxious emotional states that parallel these as 
precipitating both experiences of flashing glimpses (sphūrti) of Kṛṣṇa as well as the 
culminating and more dramatic private perceptual experiences that he describes and appraises 
as a direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa.  
Multiple studies of both clinical and non-clinical populations suggest that emotions, 
particularly stress and anxiety, are associated with the onset of experiences that are appraised as 
hallucinations. Stress and anxiety are generalized psychological terms that can characterize a 
range of specific emotional states. The Oxford Dictionary of Psychology (2006) defines stress 
as ‘psychological and physical strain or tension generated by physical, emotional, social, 
economic, or occupational circumstances, events, or experiences that are difficult to manage or 
endure’ (Coleman, 2006, p. 731) and anxiety as ‘a state of uneasiness, accompanied by 
dysphoria and somatic signs and symptoms of tension, focused on apprehension of possible 
failure, misfortune, or danger’ (Coleman, 2006, p. 46).  
In a study performed by Frank Larøi and Martial Van der Linden (2005), nearly one-
fourth of their non-clinical participants indicated that their hallucinatory experiences occurred 
in the context of a particularly difficult or stressful life event (Larøi and Van der Linden, 2005, 
p. 41).  In another study, Paul Allen et al. (2005) evaluated the influence of emotions and 
reasoning on the generation of hallucinatory experiences among a sample of 327 
undergraduates with no history of mental illness. Among the measures each participant filled 
out were the Launay Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS), which is designed to measure 
hallucinatory predispositions by assessing clinical and sub-clinical hallucinatory experiences, 
and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS), which is designed to measure symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, and stress. Higher scores on the former indicate a greater frequency of 
hallucinatory experiences, and higher scores on the latter indicate higher levels of emotional 
distress. Among the results, the study found that high levels of anxiety were a significant 
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predictor of hallucinatory experiences among the non-clinical population (Allen et al., 2005, p. 
131).  
Studies have also implicated emotional states of bereavement that accompany the loss of 
a loved one in the onset of experiences that are appraised as hallucinatory. For example, a study 
on fifty people in the first year after the death of a spouse, which would generally be considered 
a highly stressful even, indicated that post-bereavement hallucinations were frequent and 
considered helpful: ‘Half of the subjects felt the presence of the deceased (illusions); about one 
third reported seeing, hearing and talking to the deceased (hallucinations). Former marital 
harmony was found to make a person more prone to loneliness, crying and hallucinations or 
illusions’ (Grimby, 1993, p. 72). 
Parallels 
In light of these studies, it is significant to note that Viśvanātha describes the devotee as 
experiencing an escalation of stressful and anxious states just prior to the occurrence of what he 
describes and appraises as the devotee’s direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa. For 
example, during the stage of āsakti, which immediately precedes the stage of bhāva, during 
which Viśvanātha describes the practitioner as intensely longing to experience the various 
sensory dimensions of Kṛṣṇa’s form and experiencing brief‘flashing visions’ (tadīya-sphūrti) 
of Kṛṣṇa, he compares the devotee’s state of mind to the highly anxious state of a covetous 
merchant who has become greedy for great wealth. These glimpses cause him to rejoice as if he 
had attained him directly (kadāpi tadīya-śphūrtau taṃ sākṣāt prāptavad iva ceto hṛṣyet), but 
then cause the devotee to become depressed and exhausted upon their disappearance (tadaiva 
tat-tirobhāve viṣīdet glāyed).37 
Then, as bhāva matures into premā, Viśvanātha describes the devotee as anxiously 
thinking and reflecting on the Lord (bhagavat-cintanam) and increasingly longing for a direct 
                                                 
37 Mādhurya Kādambinī 7.2. 
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perceptual experience of him (bhagavat-sākṣātkāram), which he compares to a hunger that 
cannot be satiated and that burns like the sun until he receives a direct experience of Kṛṣṇa.38 
Following the escalation of this longing, Viśvanātha describes the Lord as appearing within the 
domain of the devotee’s eyes (kṣaṇe bhaktasyāsya nayana-gocarīkaroti) and manifesting 
(prakāśyate) the various aspects and qualities of his form to the senses of the devotee.39 It is 
also worth noting here that the Gauḍīya tradition advocates cultivating a form of devotion that 
is characterized by intense feelings of loss and separation from Kṛṣṇa (viraha-bhakti) that are 
comparable in many ways to feelings of deep bereavement.40 
Further research 
These parallels suggest that anxious and stressful emotional states may be a factor in 
occurrences of private perceptual experiences that Viśvanātha and other early Gauḍīya 
theologians reference, describe, and appraise as direct perceptual experiences of Kṛṣṇa. In order 
to gain further support for this working hypothesis, we can transform it into a potentially 
testable hypothesis, an example of which could read as follows: High levels of anxiety that are 
associated with feelings of eagerness and longing to be with Kṛṣṇa predict increased 
experiences of Kṛṣṇa that seem real to the practitioner but for which there is no corresponding 
external stimuli that are observable to others. Formulating such a hypothesis can serve as a 
starting point for developing more refined hypotheses and appropriate experimental and quasi-
experimental research designs for generating quantitative data in contemporary contexts that 
will support or weaken the working hypothesis. In this particular case, the data would shed light 
on whether or not such emotional states have a significant correlation with people’s experiences 
of Kṛṣṇa.  
                                                 
38 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.3. 
39 Mādhurya Kādambinī 8.4-6. 
40 For an extended discussion on the historical antecedents and developments documenting the rise and elevation of this 
form of bhakti, which was later appropriated into early Gauḍīya theological developments, see Hardy (1983). 
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Conceptual processing 
Psychological research has also implicated conceptual processing mechanisms, especially the 
role of expectations and culture, in the occurrence and content formation of private perceptual 
experiences that are appraised as hallucinations. Parallel to this, devotees learn and are primed 
to expect a direct and immediate encounter with Kṛṣṇa in the course of their spiritual 
development through their study of sacred texts, engagement in sādhana practices, and 
immersion in Gauḍīya theological teachings. 
Research on experiences appraised as hallucinations has implicated top-down cognitive 
processing, also known as conceptual processing, in their occurrence. ‘Top-down’ cognitive processing 
refers to processes that contribute to perception that do not originate in the external world but in the 
mind-brain of the perceiver (Aleman and Larøi, 2008, p. 91). As a result, missing information from 
expected sensory input is typically, though not always, correctly inferred or imposed in light of what a 
person expects to perceive:  
Expecting you are about to see or hear something primes the perceptual system and actually 
lowers thresholds for perception. Such expectations can be conscious (e.g., explicit task 
instructions that you are going to hear something) or implicit and nonconscious (e.g., by being 
conditioned to expect hearing certain noises in certain environments without being aware of 
that) (Aleman and Larøi, 2008, p. 102).  
 
Priming here specifically refers to conditions that bias a person or a group of people to interpret 
information that is presented to the senses in particular ways.  
 A research study demonstrating the contribution expectations can play to erroneous 
perceptions can be found in Barber’s and Calverley’s hallmark ‘White Christmas’ study (1964). 
The study involved 78 females, who were asked to close their eyes and hear a phonograph 
record with words and music playing ‘White Christmas’ (best-selling single of all time). After 
30 seconds they were asked to open their eyes and indicate whether they heard the music 
clearly and believed the record had been playing; heard the music clearly and knew there was 
no record playing; had a vague impression of the record playing the music; or did not hear the 
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record. Even though the experimenters did not actually play any record, 49% of the subjects 
reported that they had clearly heard the phonograph record, but knew there was no record 
playing, and 5% reported clearly hearing the music and thought the record was actually playing, 
even though there was no record being played. In both instances, the induced expectation that 
certain music was playing led to the perception of hearing the music being played. 
 Relatedly, in a study that attempts to integrate research findings on the role of socio-
cultural factors in relation to experiences appraised as hallucinations across cultures, Ihsan Al-
Issa (1995) argues that ‘cultural beliefs may increase both the expectancy of the individual and 
perceived probability of certain types of hallucinations, under certain culturally controlled 
conditions. In non-Western cultures, for example, through a long process of socialization, 
individuals see and hear what is expected of them, increasing their level of suggestibility for 
these experiences’ (Al-Issa, 1995, 371).   
 Culture has also been implicated as a formative factor in shaping the content of 
experiences that are appraised as hallucinations. In a seminal study, Kausar Suhail and 
Raymond Cochrane (2002) compared the phenomenological content of hallucinations in three 
sample population groups of schizophrenic patients: 1) Pakistanis living in Britain (BP), 2) 
Pakistanis living in Pakistan (PP), and 3) and British white people living in Britain (BW). These 
three population groups were chosen because British Pakistanis were theorized to be more 
similar to Pakistanis living in Pakistan in terms of background cultural factors but more similar 
to British white patients in terms of their immediate environment, namely a British urban 
environment. They found that ‘comparisons indicated greater differences in phenomenology of 
delusions and hallucinations between the Pakistani pair (BP vs. PP) than between the British 
groups (BP vs. BW)’ (Suhail and Cochrane, 2002, p.126). On the basis of these results, Suhail 
and Cochrane conclude that culture plays a significant role in influencing the content of 
hallucinations in participants (Suhail and Cochrane, 2002, p. 137). 
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Parallels 
Within the early Gauḍīya context and the more general religious cultural context of India of 
which the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava tradition would have constituted a sub-culture, the notion that a 
practitioner could have a direct and immediate encounter with a deity such as Kṛṣṇa (or any 
other deity), would have been viewed as entirely within the realm of possibility and, if the path 
of bhakti is executed faithfully, expected. This particularly holds true in light of multiple 
references to such experiences occurring that early Gauḍīya theological authorities include in 
their written works, which shape what devotees learn to expect to happen while traversing the 
path of bhakti.41 These expectations are implicitly reflected in Viśvanātha’s descriptions.  
 Moreover, the social context, culture, and environment in which a devotee lived and the 
religious practices in which he or she would have been engaged would have served to augment 
and chronically prime the devotee to expect a direct perceptual experience (sākṣātkāra) of 
Kṛṣṇa. For example, devotees typically lived in domiciles that were replete with objects of 
worship and other reminders of Kṛṣṇa that were invested with soteriological significance and 
meaning, such as images of Kṛṣṇa that have been constructed and ritually installed on a home 
altar, sacred texts, and other paraphernalia related with Kṛṣṇa or his worship. Gauḍīya teachings 
further emphasize living among and exclusively associating with a community of Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇavas and/or living near or in a physical institution that was dedicated to the practice of 
devotion to Kṛṣṇa. They emphasize residing in places of pilgrimage, such as Vṛndāvana, which 
is held to be invested with Kṛṣṇa’s divine presence and which has innumerable associations 
with Kṛṣṇa that would have served to constantly remind a practitioner of Kṛṣṇa. They also 
emphasize regularly engaging in hearing of and singing about Kṛṣṇa’s divine names (nāmas), 
forms (rūpas), qualities (guṇas), and play (līlā), including his ability to manifest himself at any 
moment to the faithful devotee; venerating his deity image (mūrti) as a living deity; engaging in 
                                                 
41 See for example, Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu 1.1.39, 1.2.182, 2.5.11, 2.5.81, and 3.1.36-42; Bhakti Sandarbha 1, 7, 15, 16, 
161, 179, 187, 188, 189, 234, 256, 268, 277, and 279; and Mādhurya Kādambinī 6 and 8. 
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meditative visualizations that focus on envisioning oneself in elaborate detail as a participant in 
Kṛṣṇa’s divine play (līlā); and other practices that bolster belief in Kṛṣṇa and expectations that 
Kṛṣṇa will directly manifest himself to the devotee. 
Further research 
The parallels above suggest that a devotee with strong expectations that Kṛṣṇa will directly 
reveal himself to the devotee is likely to lower the devotee’s perceptual threshold for having 
such an experience. In order to gain further support for this working hypothesis, we can 
transform it into a potentially testable hypothesis, an example of which could read as follows: 
Among those who identify as Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas, strong expectations that Kṛṣṇa will directly 
reveal himself predicts more occurrences of such experiences than weak expectations that 
Kṛṣṇa will reveal himself. Such a hypothesis can then serve as a starting point for developing 
more refined hypotheses and appropriate experimental and quasi-experimental research designs 
for generating quantitative data in contemporary contexts that can support or weaken the 
working hypotheses. In this particular case, the data would shed light on whether or not a 
devotee’s expectations can play a role in the occurrence of private perceptual experiences that 
may be described and appraised as experiences of Kṛṣṇa.  
 We can also transform the research question of whether or not Gauḍīya religious culture 
influences the content of experiences that are interpreted, described, and appraised as 
experiences of Kṛṣṇa into a potentially testable hypothesis. For example: Among indigenous 
devotional practitioners living in West Bengal who have a tendency to have experiences that are 
believed to be experiences of a deity, being devoted to Kṛṣṇa predicts more experiences that are 
appraised as experiences of the deity Kṛṣṇa than the goddess Kālī and being devoted to Kālī 
predicts more experiences that are appraised as experiences of Kālī than Kṛṣṇa. As before, these 
hypotheses can serve as a starting point for developing more refined testable hypotheses and 
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appropriate research designs for generating quantitative data that can support or weaken the 
working hypothesis.  
Source-monitoring 
Psychological research has also implicated source-monitoring errors in the occurrence of private 
perceptual experiences that are appraised as hallucinations. Parallel to this, Viśvanātha explicitly 
recognizes the possibility of source-monitoring errors in his descriptions of the devotee’s puzzlement 
regarding what later turns out to be appraised and accepted as a direct perceptual experience 
(sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa.  
Building on source-monitoring theories, Richard Bentall (1990) argues ‘that the available 
evidence suggests that hallucinations result from a failure of the metacognitive skills involved in 
discriminating between self-generated and external sources of information’ (Bentall, 1990, p. 82). In 
other words, he is arguing that experiences that are appraised as hallucinations occur when the 
metacognitive skills that we use to discern the source from which the information was derived fails for 
one reason or another. Building on Bentall’s theory, Larøi and Woodward (2007) examine two critical 
dimensions of source-monitoring in relation to hallucinations: 1) the self-generated/non-self-generated 
dimension, and 2) the inner/outer dimension:  
The former dimension refers to the perceived/subjective origin of a given cognitive 
event. For example, a cognitive event that is perceived as produced by the person 
him/herself is considered a self-generated event, but a cognitive event that is perceived 
as generated not by the person, but by an external agent, is characterized as a non-self-
generated event. The second dimension refers to the localization of the cognitive event 
in space. An event that the person locates in inner space is referred to as an inner event. 
In contrast, an event that the person locates in outer space—that is, outside of the 
subject—is referred to as an outer event. It is important to underline that it is the 
subjective experience of an event being inner, outer, self-generated, or non-self-
generated that is decisive (Larøi and Woodward, 2007, p. 111).  
 
Larøi and Woodward hypothesize that the combination of these two dimensions gives rise to 
four different types of cognitive events: 1) inner, self-generated events; 2) inner, non-self-generated 
events; 3) outer, self-generated events; and 4) outer, non-self-generated events. Inner, self-generated 
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events are ordinary and commonly experienced. They include, for example, daydreams, memories, 
songs, imagery, bodily sensations, images, voices, thoughts, ideas, sounds, and impulses: ‘For all these 
events, the subjective origin is the person (i.e., self-generated) and the subjective spatial location is 
internal (i.e., inner)’ (Larøi and Woodward, 2007, p. 111). When these inner, self-generated events are 
experienced as inner non-self-generated events, outer self-generated events, or outer non-self-generated 
events, they are considered forms of hallucinations. In other words, ‘hallucinations may be viewed as 
inner, self-generated events that are erroneously attributed’ (Larøi and Woodward, 2007, p. 111).  
Based on these distinctions, Larøi and Woodward further hypothesize that there are two 
cognitive processing steps that underlie the onset of hallucinations: the alienation of inner, self-
generated events and the misattribution of inner, self-generated events:  
The first type of cognitive process involves loss of the cognitive representations that 
code the inner, self-generated nature of what will become a hallucination. In other words, 
an inner, self-generated event is (subjectively speaking) not clearly experienced as inner, 
self-generated, or both. The second type of cognitive process occurs when hallucinators 
attribute inner, self-generated events to the specific origin/location combination that 
determines their hallucinatory experience (Larøi and Woodward, 2007, pp. 111-112). 
 
Thus, alienation of an inner, self-generated event refers to those inner, self-generated events that are 
not experienced as such due to a loss of the cognitive representations that indicate their self-generated 
nature. Misattribution of an inner, self-generated event refers to those inner, self-generated events that 
are misattributed to an outer, self-generated event; outer, non-self-generated event; or an innner, non-
self-generated event.  
Parallels 
In light of the above, it is reasonable to infer that in some cases devotees’ metacognitive skills could 
become disrupted or fail in someway that leads them to attribute an inner, self-generated event to an 
inner, non-self-generated event that is believed to be or have been an instance of directly perceiving 
Kṛṣṇa. Indeed, Viśvanātha himself indicates an awareness of this possibility while narrating the 
devotee’s thoughts at the conclusion of his experiences of Kṛṣṇa. There he describes the devotee as 
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being confused about the source of his experience to such an extent that he ponders whether or not 
what he has experienced was an authentic experience of Kṛṣṇa or a creation of his mind due to his 
strong desires for Kṛṣṇa (kiṃ vā manoratha-paripāka-prāpto’ yaṃ vastu-viśeṣah), among other 
possibilities. It’s not until another devotee assures him that he must have had a direct perceptual 
experience (sākṣātkāra) of Kṛṣṇa that he comes to recognize and accept what has occurred.42  
Further research 
In light of the above parallels, we can develop the following potentially testable hypothesis, which can 
serve as starting point for more refined testable hypotheses: Among practitioners who claim to have 
equally strong expectations that Kṛṣṇa will reveal himself, higher occurrences of experiences that are 
appraised as experiences of Kṛṣṇa predict higher occurrences of other kinds of source-monitoring 
errors. If the hypothesis is supported, it provides indirect correlational support that source-monitoring 
errors may be playing a role in the generation of at least some experiences that are appraised as 
experiences of Kṛṣṇa.  
Methodological limitations and future research 
Traditional historical-critical methods are critical tools for evaluating and interpreting the extent to 
which the details of Viśvanātha’s descriptions are explicitly or implicitly borrowed from and/or 
informed by previous ideas, teachings, and categories; they can parse out much of what is inherited or 
borrowed, what is original, and their relationship in light of historical circumstances. The approach I 
have used in this paper serves as an additional tool in the toolbox of methods available to historians for 
evaluating and interpreting historical data and claims. In trying to make sense of the private perceptual 
experiences that Viśvanātha and other early Gauḍīya theologians reference, describe, and appraise as 
direct perceptual experiences of Kṛṣṇa, private perceptual experiences that are appraised as 
hallucinations in psychological contexts seem, prima facie, to share uniquely similar structural and 
phenomenological features. Since more is understood about the natural processes involved in the 
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occurrence of the latter, it consequently serves as a promising heuristic analogue for thinking about 
what natural processes could be involved in the former. In the process of comparing this heuristic 
analogue with the case study, a series of more specific parallels then emerged, further suggesting that 
similar naturally occurring mental processes and conditions could be involved in occurrences of both. 
As discussed above, these parallels include 1) an escalation of stressful and anxious types of emotional 
states that immediately precede and lead up to the occurrence of the private perceptual experience; 2) a 
sense of heightened, primed, and culturally determined expectation of a particular kind of perceptual 
experience, which then occurs; and 3) ambiguity about the source of the private perceptual experience 
from the perspective of the person described as having the experience. While the inferences derived 
from observing these parallels are not conclusive, they do serve to warrant further research and 
investigation.  
To this end, three complementary avenues of future research seem particularly promising. The 
first is historical and involves cross-referencing and analyzing various references and descriptions of 
private perceptual experiences of Kṛṣṇa that Viśvanātha, other early Gauḍīya theologians, and the 
teachings they directly and indirectly build on describe and appraise as direct perceptual experiences of 
Krṣṇa and other deities both within and outside the Gauḍīya tradition and at different points of time in 
history. Such cross-referencing, which is standard practice for historians, can help us get a better 
handle on the kinds of experiences that individuals or communities appraise as experiences of Kṛṣṇa 
and other deities; differences and similarities between the descriptions of these experiences; their 
frequency and importance; the extent to which early Gauḍīya theologians reference and build on other 
theologians’ descriptions or other sources that may or may not be appropriated within the Gauḍīya 
tradition; and so on. Such research would provide a basis for identifying portions of Viśvanātha’s text 
that he is repeating and embellishing and more resources for hypothesizing about the extent to which 
his descriptions may be reflective of personal experiences he or others had.  
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A second avenue of research is ethnographic and involves interviewing living practitioners and 
developing a database of information related to private perceptual experiences and other experiences 
they have had. Such a database could include narrative descriptions of experiences and their effects on 
the person who had them; details regarding the time, place and circumstances leading up to, during, and 
following the occurrence of the experiences; and extensive demographic information about the 
practitioner’s practices, beliefs, cultural background and living environments. Such information can 
then be analyzed and used as a basis for developing a typology of experiences that are appraised as 
experiences of Kṛṣṇa; discerning patterns in the descriptions and/or the circumstances surrounding the 
occurrence of any experiences; and discerning relationships between experiences and beliefs, practices, 
emotions, immediate environment, events, and so on. The results of these analyses can be compared 
with analyses of historical descriptions and data to look for patterns of similarities and differences that 
may shed further light on the extent to which experiences that early Gauḍīya theologians refer to and 
describe as experiences of Kṛṣṇa are plausible and what mental processes are involved in their 
generation and formation. 
Analysis of the above historical and ethnographic information can also contribute to a third 
avenue of research, which I have advocated throughout this paper, which is experimental and quasi-
experimental research. The above historical and ethnographic information can serve as a basis from 
which to develop refined testable hypotheses and construct or adapt adequate research designs for 
obtaining evidence in contemporary contexts for the role that specific types of mental processes may 
have played in the generation and formation of private perceptual experiences in historical contexts that 
Viśvanātha and others describe and appraise as experiences of directly perceiving Kṛṣṇa. For scholars 
trained in the humanities, this step in the research process provides an opportunity to work in 
conjunction with interdisciplinary collaborators or an impetus to learn the interdisciplinary skills 
needed to formulate refined testable hypotheses, construct or adapt appropriate research designs, 
implement those designs, and collect and analyze the data. 
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Conclusion  
In conclusion, psychological research on our heuristic analogue has implicated a range of 
specific mental processes in the occurrence of private perceptual experiences that may form a 
phenomenological basis for what Viśvanātha and other early Gauḍīya theologians reference, 
describe, and appraise as experiences of perceiving Kṛṣṇa directly (sākṣāt). Further historical, 
ethnographic, experimental, and quasi-experimental research can help further tease apart and 
better discern to what extent these references and descriptions are likely borrowed; to what 
extent they may be reflective of actual experiences that Viśvanātha and/or others may have 
personally had; enrich our ability to interpret and explain critical aspects of the Gauḍīya 
tradition’s historical and theological development; reveal relationships between Gauḍīya 
religious beliefs, practices, and experiences; increase our understanding of the reasons early 
Gauḍīya theologians may have emphasized certain kinds of sādhana practices over others in 
addition to historical reasons; and shed light on what mental processes and conditions may 
contribute to occurrences of private perceptual experiences that are interpreted, described, and 
appraised as  perceiving various deities and supernatural agents not only in Gauḍīya Vaiṣnava 
historical contexts, but also in different cultures around the world in both historical and 
contemporary contexts.     
Acknowledgments 
I would like to extend a special thanks to Steven Engler, Ann Taves, and the anonymous reviewers for 
their helpful comments on the drafts of this article and to Aleksandar Uskokov for his translation 
assistance and mentoring.  
 
Primary Sources 
Bhakti Sandarbha of Jīva Gosvāmin. 2005-2006. Śrī Bhakti-Sandarbha, Vol 1-3 trans. by Satya 
Nārāyaṇa Dāsa. Vrindavan: Jiva Institute.  
 
 30
Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu of Rūpa Gosvāmin. 2003. The Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu of Rūpa Gosvāmin, trans. 
David L. Haberman. New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts; Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 
 
Mādhurya Kādambinī of Viśvanātha Cākravartin. 2005. Srila Vishvanath Chakravarti Thakur’s 
Madhurya Kadambini with the Piyusha-Kana Commentary of Pandit Sri Ananta das Babaji Maharaja, 
trans. and eds. Jan K. Brzezinski, et al.. Mathura: Sri Krishna Chaitanya Shastra Mandir.  
 
Mādhurya Kādambinī of Viśvanātha Cākravartin. 1977. Mādhurya-Kādambinī: Viśvollāsinī-Tīkā 
Sahita, ed. Śyāmadāsa. Śrī Vṛndāvana: Śrīharināma Prakāśana. 
Secondary Sources 
Aleman, André, and Frank Larøi. 2008. Hallucinations. Washington, D.C.:  
American Psychological Association.  
 
Al-Issa, Ihsan. 1995. The Illusion of Reality or the Reality of an Illusion? Hallucinations and Culture. 
British Journal of Psychiatry 166: 368-373. 
 
Allen, Paul, Daniel Freeman, Philip McGuire, Philippa Garety, Elizabeth Kuipers, David Fowler, Paul 
Bebbington, Catherine Green, Graham Dunn, Katarzyna Ray. 2005. The Prediction of Hallucinatory 
Predisposition in Non-Clinical Individuals: Examining the Contribution of Emotion and Reasoning. 
British Journal of Clinical Psychology 44: 127-132. 
 
American Psychiatric Association. 2013. Diagnostic and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association. 
 
Barber, Theodore Xenophone, David Smith Calverly. 1964. An Experimental Study of “hypnotic 
(auditory and visual) hallucinations. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 68 (1): 13-20.  
 
Bentall, Richard P. 1990. The Illusion of Reality: A Review and Integration of Psychological Research 
on Hallucinations. Psychological Bulletin, 107/1: 82-95. 
 
Brzezinski, Jan K. 1997. Does Kṛṣṇa Marry the Gopīs in the End? The Svakīyā-vāda of Jīva Gosvāmin. 
Journal of Vaiṣṇava Studies 5/4: 56-63. 
 
Brzezinski, Jan K. 1999. Mystic Poetry: Rūpa Gosvāmin’s Uddhava-sandeśa & Haṃsadūta. Hong 
Kong: Mandala Publishing Group. 
 
Cangas, Adolfo J., José M. García-Montes, Manual López. L. de Lemus, Juan J. Olivencia. 2003. 
Social and Personality Variables Related to the Origin of Auditory Hallucinations. International 
Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 3/2: 195-208. 
 
Coleman, Andrew M. 2006. The Oxford Dictionary of Psychology, 2nd edition. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
David, Anthony S. 2004. The Cognitive Neuropsychiatry of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations: An 
Overview. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 9: 107-124. 
 
 31
Forman, Robert K. C., ed. 1990. The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Grimby, Agneta. Bereavement Among Elderly People: Grief Reactions, Post-Bereavement 
Hallucinations and Quality of Life. Acta Psychiatri Scandinavica 87/1: 72-80. 
 
Haberman, David L. 1988. Acting as a Way of Salvation: A Study of Rāgānugā Bhakti Sādhana. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hardy, Friedhelm. 1983. Viraha-Bhakti: The Early History of Kṛṣṇa Devotion in South India. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Holdrege, Barbara A. 2007. The Embodied Aesthetics of Mystical Realization: Enraptured Devotion and 
Bodies of Bliss in Kṛṣṇa Bhakti. ARC: The Journal of the Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill 
University 35: 55-92. 
 
Katz, Steven T., ed. 1978. Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. New York:  Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Larøi, Frank, Martial Van der Linden. 2005. Nonclinical Participants’ Reports of Hallucinatory 
Experiences. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 37/1: 33-43. 
 
Larøi, Frank, Martial Van der Linden, Philippe Marczewski. 2004. The Effects of Emotional Salience, 
Cognitive Effort and Meta-Cognitive Beliefs on a Reality Monitoring Task in Hallucination-Prone 
Subjects. British Journal of Clinical Psychology 43: 221-233. 
 
Larøi, Frank, and Todd S. Woodward. 2007. Hallucinations from a Cognitive Perspective. Harvard 
Review of Psychiatry 15/3: 109-117. 
 
Luhrmann, Tanya. M. 2011. Hallucinations and Sensory Overrides. Annual Review of Anthropology 
40: 71-85. 
 
Ohayon, Maurice M. 2000. Prevalence of Hallucinations and Their Pathological Associations in the 
General Population. Psychiatry Research 97: 153-164. 
 
Suhail, Kausar, and Raymond Cochrane. 2002. The Effect of Culture and Environment on the 
Phenomenology of Delusions and Hallucinations. International Journal of Social Psychiatry 48/2: 126-
138. 
 
 
 
 
 
